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ABSTRACT 
We report results from experimental markets in which two du' '''J',,~,.'' 
water are supplied to two types of consumers: households and farmers. " 
rios studied, we vary strategic complexity (and centralization) by 
of agents per market. Centralization of information by a mulL'f.TJLvu.u,", 
(scenario 1) improves market perfonnance with respect to a duopoly 
downstream coordinator (scenario 3) succeeds in mitigating upstream 
In a complex setup like ours, sorne centralization on the supply or the 
may enhance market efficiency. 
Key words: water quality, experimental markct, complex system, 
market efficiency 
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1 . INTRODUCTlON 
Water is necessary for multiple purposes ranging [rom íts use as a 
gooJ (potable water and water for recrcational activities) to water as a 
factor (industrial usage, energy generation, intrinsíc usage to c1ean up 
Interaction of usage is complex, since used water retums in different 
be subject to irreversibility (let alone the problems accruing due lO water's 
temporal dimensions). 
Since early debates on market regulation, the management of natural 
(among which water is usuaUy mentioncd as the most necessary for life) , 
considercd a task of major economic, ecological and polítical importance. 
cases, water management has been undertaken by statc or local authoríties. 
in sorne countries with a strong tradition in decentralizcd market institutions, 
blem of water scarcity has been tackled with decentralized management by 
less coordinated eeonomic agents. A usual critique of such solutions is . 
ract that water is a necessary cornmodity whose accessibility by al! should 
on market conditions and the fem that market prices might make water a 
good» for low income citizens. This fear is basicaJly founded on two 
Firsl, utility maximization by decentralized agents muy be incompatible 
maximization of welfare. Second, decentralized agents may fai! to 
with the dynamic aspects of the exploitation of a resource and its distn 
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'!lifferent uses, mainly bl:causc they lack informaÜon on the general functioning of rhe 
While Ihe first argument has been extensively studied, controlling for dyna-
inefficiencics and tearnlllg fai tures in comp1ex markets has been a far more 
,_j,,,,,,,,,.ng task. 
In his seminal artiele, Gordon (J 954) showed that complete renl dissipation may 
~jenlerge from the exploitation of an open aceess resouree, whereas a single owner of 
resource would be more efficient by internalizing cxploitation externalities. 
anel Lcwis (1984) established the rdated result of inverse dependence of 
accmal and the lIumber 01' resourec exrractors. Mason and Phillips ( (997) provi-
experimental e\ idence 01' this rclationship for small groups showing that an 
of the industry si/c may induce a smaller standing stock of a common 
. In the contexl oí' groundwater, Bur! (1964) proved analyticalIy rhat a mono-
induces a more conservativc usage of the resource. while perfeet competition 
d induce depletion 01' thc economic rent. 
Up to now. there has becn limíted experimental research on water resources, but 
few studies undertaken in (rather simple) eompetitive settings fed the pessimism 
resourees may be inefficiently usedl.ln an cxperiment with a statie setting, Gard-
et al. (1997) sh\ ,w that higher efficiency is achieved when a lower number of 
·ytlr~("tn1rc exploit a eornmon resource, although the expeeted non-eooperative equili-
values are not supported hy the results. In a water pumping game experimenr 
limited entry), Herr el al. (1997) observed that subjeet~ faeed with an intertem-
problcm acted '~vcn more myopically and [css ~uceessfully than in a timc-inde-
serting. Their rcsults suggest that the tragedy of rhe eommons arises also in 
world with mínimal in~titutional constraints 011 behavior, and that myopic behavior 
. a time-dependent ietting exacerbates this problem. 
In alI these papers, dynamic and static (in)c1Ticiencíes relate to horizontal exlcr-
due lO eomperition in the cxtraction 01' a common resource. However, it is 
.,'«'VIItlCJI<- to assume thar cx.lernalities may also arisc due ro downstream eompetition 
the supply or distributi(11) among firrns extraeling fmm indcpendent resourecs2 . 
1 In the resource managcrnCtll I'ron!. a number of intcresling issnes are uealt with in a series ut' 
papcrs on natural f!;¡S lransportatinn thruugh pipcllllc nctworh by Rasscnti et al. (1988) 
McCabe e[ al. (1989). 
2 Fur less complex .',elllps. Ihe cxistcnce oí' vertical relatíom. alllong markets has becn studied in 
labnrnLory in several OCGlsioIl,'. 1 '01' example, Cioodfcllo\'\ and Plott (1990) and Durham (2000) 
the results from a series ,,1' l:xpcrilllen[S OH a simple in lerms of ils paramctric structure-
with tW(l vertically rcbtcd In:¡rKl'h 
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Our setup rules out competition in the extraetion of the resource3 . 
considered here, there are two water sources of Jifferent qualitics. 
is represented by two different types of consumers: households 
water supplied to them may be the result of purificatíon, since 
sume water whose quality exceeds a mínimum IeveL The expermllelrrta 
ses on (hree different levels of strategie complexity (and 
characterized by the number of different types of (human) agents 
keL We study water alloeatian in a market where a monopoly 
poly (treatment 2), seU water of two different qualities lO the ~U'.h'UH'~ 
treatment, the duopoly sells to a monopsonist (Jownstream coordin 
behalf of both types of eonsumers4 , Given that in treatments I and 2 
simulated hy the computer, treatment 3 is the only onc in which human 
hoth sidcs oí' the market (supply and demand), A novel feature of our 
that we allow for mixing of Jifferent water qualilies. This acts as a 
dynamic efficiem:y of water tlow administration, on one hand, and 
ning under hcterogeneolls market valuations of two goods sold into a 
on lhe othe!'. Our interest in such a setting relates to sorne market tf>'ltllTP" .... 
been already Jealt with in the literature6 • and sorne of which are rather 
case of water markets7 . Among such features, we mention rnarket power; 
aclm in i stratio n, decentralization (vs, cooperati ve decisiofl -maki ng 
cfficiency), etc, 
Generally speaking, our assumptions coneerning consumer utility are .. 
wly similar to those in Williams et al, (1986) on rnultiplc commodities 
.; By dcllning property rights ()f a resource or more 10 asole owncr. lNe COI1centrale on 
which arise frOIll ¡he vertical markel ~¡ructures studied and neglel't lhe 'publíc good' 
rc.~~()urcl..' . 
·1 rnspircd un ¡he practice by many politicíans and suggestions hy atlthors like 
Leal ( 19~9), adopting Ihe formation oC coalitlOns as an efficienl ITlelhnd 01' water 
j A s used by Salelh el al. (194 J ) lo refer lo a market in whích lhere are rdatively 
(, Howc c¡ al. (1986), using a much simpler modcl lhan ours, oITcr sorne ju"tification 
úTIlS for él solution ID a prohlcm of water now managl:ment in the prcsence 01' ljuallty 
m an up,'tream-downstrearn framcwork, 
, Adrtllnislratioll 01' dYllürníc now problcms are a famous exarnple 01' such ch;U'aclen 
th,~ inll'rcst in human behavior under a1ternallVC market structurcs has been lhe most 
re,ourcc ecol1omics, tlespite the argumcnl by WOl1g alld Eheart (19íD) tha( incfficiency 
fenioll, in market design and organizatioll can be ohserved even in the case 01' sirnulated 
fec() hdlavior. 
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rde:pend.en: in c()n~llmption. Two further features which are rather specific to the 
of water are addcd to the structun: described so far: First, buyers are res-
to buy up to a certain amount of each typc of water, given that their purchases 
period are Llscd to serve their current needs. Second, a constant inflow 
comes ro illcrl:é\sc in each perind the stoek of water in the basins of eaeh 
In fte!, foHowing a standard fonnulation oY similar grollndwater extraction 
, a Ill\'v'l:r stock implil:s a highcr l:xtraetioll cost. giving rise to a positive 
belwcen each period's marginal eosh and pasl levels nf extraction. 
find that com]lL'tition on lhe supply sitie (lrcatmcnt 2) reslllts in lower social 
as cornpareu I(] a rnollopoly (IrcaLment 1). J ntrodul:ing uownstream eoordi-
(treatmcnL :)) in Ihe duopol istie markd increases market cornpctitioll. The 
'V~I"U"H"" i, llnabk to cxercisc its market power and the deadweight loss dccrea-
o¡,~'~'FA"", some n:nlralization (upstrcam nr downstream) is social1y desirable 
remairlÍng part of lhe paper is organizcd in tbe following way: section 2 pro-
some di:jcussíon 01 the thcorl:tical framcwork in wbich we derive lhe social1y 
solution. Section 3 describes lhe experimental design.ln section 4 we discuss 
ohtüncd and, in section 5, we conduue. 
~:. T¡¡u)[{l'rrCAL FRAMT,:wcmK AND SOClAL OPTl'vlUM 
to the ohvioll~ diffículties associatcd with lhe multiple interactions among 
socio-e~onol1lil: ami cnvironmental a~pects oC water managernent, theoretical 
ie modcb foclIs only 011 spccific qllestions. TbllS, most of the lilcratll-
based on partíal cquilibrillm analysís. 
See, for c),ample, (¡",er and S(rnchel (1984) .ond Rllbio al1d Casino (1999). 
'Which are suh-o[llilnal L'u11lpareu tn ,inlUlaled .ogents in trealmcnts I and :> who. by designo 
.im individl ally oplimal way. In fael, a vaSl litcralure is dedicatcd lo variOllS factors which may 
fOf observcrl shnrlconlÍngs or 11lll1l<ln bdlavior in eOIuplex environrnents, like misper-
offeedback (paich ami S\erman, 199:1, and Slcrman,l9(4), limitations in subjeets' leaming 
tu stratcgic cnrnplcxity (RIChards anrl Hays, 1498), or multi-task decision making. 
wi:h asytnllll'lries (García-Gallego and Ckorgantzís, 200 1, ami García-Gallego el al.. 
numbcr of Jaclol", lllal r¡¡VOUr subjects' illlpro\'cmcnt al' performance havc. a!so, bccn íden-
eJi.amrle. trial-and-crror algorithms llave heell ,,!lown lo racilitale COlJvcrgcnce ()f the stra-
by UllIllfOl!lll'" ,uhjects towarJs syllltllclric. lülJ-informalion cquilibrillln prcdictions, 
in Gard¡¡·( ;,II1v,', ". \ q')X) ror ¡he case "r a I'ricc-.sctting oligojJoly. 
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Al[uifers should be considercd as different both from renewable and 
wable resources. because the recharge does no! imply an intrinsíc growth 
cxisting stock bUI is, generally speaking. exogenously generated. 
cxtractioll rate exceeds the reehargc rate, the stock will be exhausted, 
exlractioll whieh equals the reeharge, a hydro-eeonomic equilibrium 
bling an infinite cxploitation. Costs of cxtractioll, whieh arise 
illversely rclatcd to the aquifer's water table. 
Ln our model there are two rencwable stocks (aquifers) SI{ and SI. 
water may be extraeted. For the sake oY ~implieity, assume that the rp{·tl" ...... , 
respective basin is deterministíc and constant. The inflow to the respective. 
assumed to ecase whcn the storage capacíry ofthe aquifer is reached. The 
of eOllsumed water is assumed to be ncgligible. Thus, ehanges in the stoeks 
10 extraction and recharge only. Extraetion costs are supposed (o be twice 
tiahle functions of quantity and stock ~ize. First derivatives are assumed to 
rectively, positive and negative, whcreas second derivatives are positive. 
We eonsider the possibility that the water resourccs differ in their rp."·T",."ti·",;i· 
lities. Quality of water in an aquifer may he lower duc to marine inlrusion or 
infiltration of fertilizcr fmm agriculture. Let Ihe qualities be dcnotcd rp"npC't;,,,,.l, 
QII and Q¡, wherc QH > Q¡ >0. The qualities are assumed to be constant over 
However, lhere exists the possibility of providing any intermediate quality by 
water of the Iwo sources. Mixing quantities K,{ and K, of the two qualities 
water wllOse l[uulity is given hy: 
K',ºII + K,.Q, 
Qc, (KII• K¡. Q/I' QJ = ------
Quality of potable water should weakly exceed thc constant minimum 
standard Q",,", where Q/f > Q",m > Q/,. Mixed water of quality Q>I may or may 
'iatisl'y the minimum quality standard. depending on the qLwnlities and the 
whieh are mixed. In any case, any quality may be improved at a eost, which is 
inercasing function of the differcncc betwcen the l[uality hefore ane! after 
tioll. Moreover, a givcn improvement DQ of a lowcr quality is Jess costly tban 
s:tllle improvelllellt performcd on a higher quality. Let (he initial quality subject 
purification he QI/' The purification (osL denoted by C\J K, DQ. Qu)' for a 
water qtlantily K=KH+K/, ' is assumed to satisfy the following eonditions: 
MIXTI :RF '\[\,lJ 1 liS mllll'T10!\ OF D11+I,R"N'1 \\ATER QUAl.ITIES' 
.. LV I,X "/:I\/M/:,\" IJV IFRTlCAL ,ITRIH'lI'/IJ., h ,\ ('(!Ml'l.I,X !vl,\I<I\FI' 
ac,o ¡¡2e\" 
-~._-'~> _ .. ---.:...> 
¡¡( - I(J (j2C,[) ac Ir! 
.--> --"~> _. 
(JK aK" ¡¡!'MI íJ( t.Qf '¡(le, > 
\() 
a"e,o 
iJQI.2 
lO] 
>0 (2) 
A centralízeu krot nwy eXIst which co-ordinat.:~ the resource tlow betwcen the 
anu the consume)'s. 'l'he principal objective 01' the distribution knot is the een-
of (he uecisions abuur quantity anu quality sLLpply and the distribution ro 
respective consumers. Figures 1 ami '2 sho\\' lhe distriblltion scheme that opera-
in eaeh seenario. 
Suppose there are rnan}' l"()J1surncrs in the economy whose behavior can be aggre-
under one 01' l\vo tYIW'i; i) the h()llSehold~ (/1) and ii) the farmers (F). Consu-
uiffer in their respective prcfcrenccs regarding the quaJity of water. Both typcs 
a higher quality of the resource to a lower onG. Farmers prefer more quantity 
each product to less. HoweveL households will eonsurne water whosc quality 
excceds a minimuHl ,tanuard. 11' mixed ljuality does not satisfy this condition 
will be subject to purifieauon. The purification proeedure is assumed to be costly 
that it is not Jrofitablc to improve quality abovc the minimum standard. Hen-
, the quality consumed by households will be the maxirnum between the minimum 
ity and the mixed qualily. Thus. Qo = 0.\1 and 
Let the hOllscholds take lhc purificarion cos( inlo account in their utilíty function 
assume the uUity fUllctions Uh=U¡, (K,.Q",) anu UJ,=U, (KJ,QMI) (whcre 
+K/.h' and K¡,=K/JJ+Ku) nI' the respective eonsLll11er-types to be twiee diffe-
with respect lo qUClnlÍty and mixed quality. Farlllers' utility is increasing in 
arguments. while clepending on the purificat!on cmt funetion. rhe utilíty func-
of hOllseholds lllight be i ncreasing in the quantity of low qua lit y only up to ti cer-
limil. In facr. it will be Inereasing if míxcd L[uality weakly exceeds the mínimum 
standard. Frnm lhe <!:;:;umptio!1 of t\vice dillcrcntiability of the utility func-
it follows that the sum uf IhG functiomi is lwiee differentiable. too. The indirect 
wclfare funct Ion V( K'I' KJ) which maxirni,.,cs consumer surplus for a gi ven 
of water can be de'icribed as follows: 
IIP NIKOI /\()~ (iEORU,\.vrzís. Al !fU JRA (¡;\RCL\-GAU.EGO. 
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V (KI/' K,) = IIWX Uh (K"", Kw Q,\/I,; K". K I) + UF (K"I'" KI.I' QWF; K , 
Kw,/,· K¡ . ./¡i, 
s.l. 
(i) KI! '" K"i, + Kili 
(ii) K, = K'i' + KI.I 
0 11 Kili! + QI K,,, 
KilI> + Ku! 
( i l'! QIII QII Kili + QI Ku 
KIli' + KII 
f\S a benchmark ror ou1' experimental results, we are interesled in 
oprimal ~()ltlti()n (Jf water supply. Givcn the assumprions above, we 
propam lhar maximízcs social welfare 1o . Without loss 01' generality, 
initiaHy rhe resource stocks are in the natural hydrological equilibrium, 
llppet bOllnu 01' the storage eapacity. Let. uenotc, respectívdy, recharges of 
lit)' water, anu 11) lhe starting time of extraetioI1. Assume lhe social rate of 
J= J. Thus. the intt:rtemporal ohjectivc functioJ1 is formulateu as follows 
/lliI \ 
/",,1\, 
.1'.1. 
( i) 
!iiJ 
(iii) 
(i\) 
dSI!; {-K"I + IIIi' it Sil < S/I'II'" 
-d-;-"'O S/I""", ()thenl'isc 
liS,! { -Ku + ([l.' (f\ < S/,"" 
~!f- '= S/",/1, ofhcrwisc 
s = S 111,[\ 
1I"i" ¡/ 
,)', 'q .:-::: 5', m!U 
,,' I¡¡<leed. j¡ i.' a prohkm wh¡ch is ,olvahle hy mean., of optimall"OlllroJ theory, wherc the 
dre IIIL' ,I;¡le, ,uld ,Ile l.luantilic, lhe control \-ari,lrJ!c" 
--------------------------------------------------- - --
~,IIXT\ :RI', :\'.1) ])1\ mIBI :'110'< OF IlIl'\:I:]':I:,1' W.\TI:J{ (jl ':\l.ITIES 
,'L'\ /:,il'UII.\!i \'1" 11:\' VUU/CM, SI/U (,JI 'IU: /N .\ ('I!.\[{'IFY MAHK1:T 
JIU 
By rneans of the rl'sulting current value Hal1liltnnian ami Pontryagin's maxirnurtl 
principie (assum lIlg <In í Iltenor solution) rhe t \\'0 follow ing cane!itions have to be 
satisfice! in the h:/{Jro-ecollolllic cquilibrium: 
av I JK~" 
ae" ((1 i!' S¡) 
(¡Sil 
(Jet- (al, ' .'l¡) 
aSl 
(5) 
These condilions in L'í) ,illlllltaneously rktennine the steady-stale standing-
stocks of Sil and '~I' Thl'Y ha..,ically stale tha!, in the long-run, the marginal social uti-
lit y , which embojie.., tfll' rl~~IX'ctive reSOl!rce pricc in the ecollomy. should equal lhe 
social casts of exLractiol1 reprcsenLcd on the righL hand side 11 • 
3. EXPERIMENTAL PARAMETERS Al\D MARKET DESIGN 
The cxpcrimenls wt:rc conducted at the Luhowlorio de investigación Ión l,:cono-
mía Experir.!cnral (UN/:/'.X), at the University of Valencia (Spain). Three treatments 
with 14 indepenc:cnt marKt:ts (per trt:aLITIt:nt) \Vele ~tl1dit:d in which a tota1 of X4 sub-
jects participated. Thc::i \\'t:rc recruitcd among 1I1ldngraduute swdcnts ()f Ecollomics 
,at the University ot' Vakncia. Urs hschbachcr\ ,nflwarc ::~rree 2011 was lIsed for 
the programing uf Ihe designo An experimental scssioll too k between two and two and 
a half hours. Subjecls t:<lrncd an averagt: of 3.'i()() ptas ('i>20). 
We use the 11Iodel de,cribed above with Lhe following values for ¡he parameters: 
(i) Recharg:.:: (111/' 11,) = Ll, 3) 
(i i) In ¡tial amI ma)( i 111 \1111 stot: k si zes L\II' Si) = (20. 20) 
(iiiJ Water qlJaJitic,: ((JI!' (J¡l = (5, 1) 
(iv) Minilllu n qua1il\' standard demanded bv ¡he household: Q""" = 3 
11 In cach condltioll, lhe' lir'll\\'o lerms, !Jolh I'0sili\'(', rcprcscnt lhe margmal (os!s whieh rc\ult 
extraeling: a q\ amily I<:!, (I\"pcctively K, I (mll1 lhe W:ltcr ,tock Sil (S, J. The lhird tcrm rcflects 
shauow pricc 01' Ihe re'Olllú'. thalls, lile IInplit~d l'n,[, induced hy a low0!' wMe!' tJhlc. which ¡¡re 
on all fllturl~ L::\.lr:ICII(111 
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Thc utility anel eosl functions used are provided in the appendix. Applying 
eljuatiol1s, in the steady state 01' the social optimum a stock size of (Sir SJ = ( 
is obtainal associatcd with the príees (P,P P,) = (102, 86), The quantities (Km' Ku.) 
ami (Kili' K".) = (0.45, 3) are assigncd, respeetively, lo household (h) and 
mI (r) eonsumptiom, Suhjects were told that sessions would last 45 uenlllC1~'" 
3.1. Experimental design 
The experiment adopted a di serete time framework. No explieit r",l-AT'.>~,.. 
made to water in rhe instructions aiming at a no-Iahel experiment. 
knew thcir product dype», in the sense thal they wcrc conscious ahout a 
láetlce by cotlsumers for one good (high quality) over the other, 
lncw that the]r produets were demand substitutes (though not perfeetly) and 
prodLlCtion cosl strueturcs were identical. Subjects receivcd atable with 
cnsb depending on the stock size (sce the instructions in the appendix). 
Consumers reccived specific information about the increases in their ' 
In'el' from each additional unir bought. Experimental subjects (consumers 
duccrs) werc introduced separate1y to their tasks and did not know any details 
the rcstrietions on the other side of the market (the information was provided 
tel) at any instance on their computer screcns). A history window would 
pasl outcomes regarding own decisions, quantities, payoffs and market prices. 
uucers and COllSUJIlers were asked to decide about thcir respective rcservation 
fm cach unit of proclucl within Ihe rangc 1 to 5 (the maximum quantity each 
lhell1 could U'aue in each period)iJ, Procluecrs had lo post, simultaneouslY,five 
offcrs which should equal the minimum price at which they were wi1líng to seU 
rcspecti \'e unir l4 , The offers had lO cxceecl weakly the cost (JI' the corresponding 
amloffcrs of subsequent units wou1d have lo be non-deereasing. On the demand 
slIbjects would have to submit five sealed bids for each product which had to be 
(monotonically) increasing for subsequent units and, al most as high as the rent 
would arise from one extra unit. The bids should refleet the maximum priee at 
1,' HowcVér. in onJer to avoid end-game bchavior, we 5loppcd se.'siono alter periad 35, 
l' Tbc ljuantity limitatian wa;, designed to account for thc lime rcótrictions af exr1enlffif:fl1 
c,'\f'os¡tion, 
l' Prod\lcer, in lrcalmen! 1 hao lO posl flVC scalcu offers for caeh producL 
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consumcrs wcr~ wilhJlg 10 purchase an addítional unit. Subjects knew that. after bids 
were announced, al! unilS ot' Ihe same prmlllct in a pcriod would be sold at the same 
market price (see instructions). 
3.2. Market i/lstitutions 
We aim at comparing lhree diffcrent market structurcs. Our basic market (treat~ 
ment 2) is dcsisl1l:d Lo be a fully decentralized structure in which resources are inde-
pendently own~d and run amI consumers act in an individually optimal (simulated) 
way. Two alternative structures are designed in which either upstream (treatment 1) 
or downstream (trcalml'nl :')) action is coordinated and, in both cases, coordinating 
agents are human subjcct,. The non coordinatcd par! of lhe market (suppliers) in tre-
atment 3 is also run hy human subjects, Therefore. together with upstream and 
downstream centralization. other shortcomlllgs of human behavior in dynamically 
, and strategical y complex environments can be anaJysed. 
Trcatment I invoJv¡;s a monopoly (j(lint owncrship of both sources) in the ups-
tream market, ami oplimal (simulatcd) coordinatiol1 of dowl1strcam behavioL One 
subject is posting price ol'fers for both water qualities, Given these offers. the maxi-
mal consumer rent is determíned in lhe simulated centralized dowl1stream market: 
V( KH'K¡) -- 11" k. whCI'L~ IV denotes the vector uf sealed offers ami k denotes lhe vec-
tor 01' quantitü: s. Thu\. the bundle of high quality and low quality water which pro-
duces the high ~st con,umer rent is allocatee! in lhe economy, and the corresponding 
offers of the sL.bject stabJ ish lhe clearing prices, 
Treatment 2 is Ol!r "hasic» and lL:asL ccntralized one with which the other two tre-
atments could be dírectly compared. In this ll'catment, we assume uneoordinated 
aetion on both sides 01' ¡he market with a duopoly (clecentralized oWl1l:rship ofrcsour-
ces) selling to t\\lO silllllJated (decentralizcd) lltility-maxímizing eonsumers. Given 
the multiplicít:/ 01' índepcndent agents. further problems in markct clesign had to be 
so] ved , Thc prl Jducer-subjec(~ did not recei ve information about how markcts would 
cIear and, therdore, ¡hey clicl not know what intluence the decisions of the competi-
tor would havE on the own demando AltllllUgh subjccts posted their offers simultane-
ously, markets clcan:d iu a ranc!olll order determincd by lhe computer l '. This mecha-
15 We uscd ItIIS lllcciJ"1l1,1l\ hecause we wcrc IlO! intcrestcd in a system¡¡tic Stackclberg markct 
~tructure, fav()rin~ I1IK 11: 11,,"' ! \\ 11 markcts ilJl(1 the c:mrcspondingly consumer type. 
1[11, :-.JIKOl.AOS Gl'O]{(;A:-.IT7.ÍS, AUWRA GARCíA-(¡AI.LE(;O, 
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ni,m was intToduced aiming at avoiding rolally incfficienl outeomcs in 
Illcrs buy too ll1uch of lhc produet which leasl hts lhcir spccific needs. Thus 
wcrc gi ven preference in the low quality markel and households were pn~ferré 
hi~h quality markct. Thereforc. a consumer was allowed lO buy in the 'other 
llnly ii the 'own' Illarket was the first lo clear and thc consumer had been 
,OI1lC excc,s denl<lnd. 
111 treatl1lcnt .3. three slIbjccts participated in each session. 
IIwncrs of the sources, aeted on Ihe (deccntralized) supply side of the 
third ()ne. a rcprcsentative eonsumer, would be on the (eentralized) 
aeting as a lllonopsonisl and reprcscnting both consumer lypes l6 _ Like in 
a rnarkd day eomprises a sequencc of two, in which the subject who acted as 
.,umer reprcse"ntatÍvc buys slIbsequently in both markets whieh opened in a 
orcler. In (he sceond market, lhe number of units purchased in the first 
takcl1 inlO aceount l7 • The markct-clearing is cletennined by means of 
across unjt offcrs and unit bids. In particular, the markct-c1earing price is 
min (""ilhin the producer's priee offers) excceded by the maximum price 
e:OIlSLllllcr's hids), for the sarne unit, which lhe consumer weTe willing to payo 
(he quantity would be determined too. 
4. RESUITS AI\I) DISCUSSION 
This section is organized in three subscetions. The first one is dedicated 
ohscr\'atíons coneerning stock sizes.ln the seeond subsection, market prices 
bid-and-ofrcr results are presentcd and cliscusscd. Finally, in the third subsection, . 
undertakc lhe comparison oí" the lhree treatments in terms 01' welfare and eflficierlc 
"lIlee' ¡'is/her carnings werc propDrlional (j()';¡.,¡ ID lité c()n~lIll1crs' ren!. 
I Sllbí~ct~' ~LTCellS wOlllJ display lhe maximal sarisfaction Ievel associateJ with ¡he 
ri(l¡¡ ni' all addlliunal unil. 
ii i ~ ;. 
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¡:i¡ •. In figure 3, (he (cull1lllulativc) distrihutioTIs 01' cnd-period stock sizes are presen-
~;~d. Stock siLes be10w lhe socially optimal hydrological steauy state stock ~ize of (SI!' 
¡.~) = (4.84, 5.(1) werc hanlly obscrved in treaLtlH.:nt 1, whereas, in treatmenls 2 anu 
l's a few times a high qllaliLy stock sil.e ()f 3 unils was rcached - which stcmmcd from 
~,~ne subject's ~'rategic" in cach trcatment. Conslderíng the distrihulÍons, we see that 
il¡~ach one of the scenari()s resulted in a dlfláenl resource-managcment. It can be seen 
~<, 
mfrom figure 3 thal tre<l!ment 1 did not produce any perceivable stock d¡fferences 
l,across water qualitics, ()n the other hanu, in trcatmcnt 2, the low quality stock domi-
bí.ates the high '.juality one, while in treatment " almost the oppositc prevails, 
;" Table 1 eo1tains d,¡ta 01\ the stock si7es in (he 14 markets aher 35 experimental 
'¡periods. A Mam-Whitney (est does nol reject lhe hypotheses of stochaslÍc equiva-
¡l·Ienee of last p(~riod stock sizes across trcatments rOl' low (respectively, high) quali-
[ities I8 . Acomm:lll fcalUre can he seen in figure c,L in which we observe a c1eclining ten-
mdency in (average) ~t(ll'ks duríng the course of the sessions. However. this trend is 
¡'!llueh weaker in treatmen! I (only significan( during lhe rirst five periods). This 
jobservation is. genera!!y ~peaking, an indieator 01' the [aet tha! subjects, in treatmen! 
il:t, have givenJfiority Lo the goal of maintaining the hydrologieal equilibrium of lhe 
~.system, wherel'i competing produccrs, in the olher two treaLments, have been trying 
~,:to seU as man~' units <1\ possiblc, In fact. in (rcatmen! 3, the decreasíng rate at whieh 
Il'this trend is pnduced indicates that prodllcers ha ve also tried to avoid selli~1g beyond 
1" flcertain point leadin~ lo slocks which fall too lo\\' (so that extraclion costs woule! not 
••.. Crease to level~ irnplying a serious cOIllpetitive disauvantage to them). 
In any case, the relatively high cxlractiol1 eosts associated wüh low slock sizes 
:}(:d subjects i 1 all rcgimes -on average- lo more eonservative extraetion than 
'1>\Iould eorres¡:ond lo the socially optimal slcady S(ate solution, In other words, we 
tain the opposite ur lhe eOIl1mon resouree overexploitation result attributed to 
" mpetition in the extraction stage, That is. the setup studiecl here results in somc 
'Ud of horiz¡:·ntal externality leading lO unc!cr-cxploitation of the resourec by firms 
ho are comreti!or" in the downstrcam market. 
18 ThrOllgh'l(lt lh" 1'''1'<'1'. \\'e' use' a a=,05 Inel ,,1' ,i!cUliricilncc, We use standard tests fmll1 Sic-
1 and C<I,tclla'l ¡ 1 '1;-:;-, 
NIKOL\()S ('FORG .. \:\TZÍS.AUIWRA (,ARCÍA-('ALLEGO. 
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4.2. Posted ofters, bids and market prices 
h,llo\ving the theorerical framework, the hypothesis has to be \/",'e;f;i"A 
ces, postcu hius and offers shoulu eorreetly reneet the diffcrenee in 
is, high quality water is expcctcd to yield highcr priees. offers and bids 
quality one. However, in a setting Iike ours, in whieh human subjects 
in an environmcnt whose market cquilihrium is far [rom obvious, the 
should not expeeL Lhis to be a trivial or even a usual result. In fact, the 
hlem implics a fUIther issue to be taken into account by subjeets who should 
care ahout what they seU and eam in caeh period but, also, what this implies 
prodllct's stock and, consequently. eaeh producer's unit costs in future 
Thc most important descriptor oí" the supply side of OUT experimental 
ami aho an indicator for the cognitive processes of subjccts with rcspect 
anu learning, is given through the posted offers (since they are the control 
oC prodlleer-subjects). Figure 5 plOlS the average of the posted offers and bids 
first unít of each water ljuality over the 35 periods of the expcriment. Table 2 
1'or eaeh trcatment, the posted offers (for the first unit of eaeh ljuality water) 
ved in períods I and 35. 
In the first periodo lhe monopolist in treatment 1 posted, in all markets, a 
orrcr 1m the first unit of high ljua]ity water than for the low quality one. In the 
periocl, lhe rest oí" the units were also offered al priees which correelly reflect 
ditfercnec~. In this treatment, the same applies for period 35 and, for the rest 
pcriods. only three times (out 01' sevenly possibilities) an inverse order was 
Along the 35 periods, and eonsidering all trearrnents, 155 times (out of 2450) 
qualitl' water \vas offered al a higher price than high ljuality one. Given that the 
wal' for prodllcers 01' controllíng their levc1 of sales was through (very high) 
we observe excessively high offers for the las! units (mainly, lhe 4 'h and yll). In 
tieuJar. the freljueney 01' Lhe event of a higher offer for the low quality is highest 
rhe fifth 1I11it 2U In sorne cases, subjects were ablc to increase their sales ofhigh 
lit y water (selling less low quality's) by raising offers for the water 01' low quality. " 
,.) This fimling s!Jould no! be eonfused with a sim¡]ar argument by Sal iba el al. (1987) concer-
ni,,!! 1m ces which do !lot reflee! waler values, where valuc differencc, are due lo water scarcity, etc. 
,'1' In facl. in most or lhe oceasioll!. in which selIers posted a higher pricc rol' low quality water 
lhall 1m high LlU<llily one, lhe eorrcsponding unit of low quality was not sold, 
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Unlike the monopo! i~t in trearment ! . ~cllcrs of low qua! ity waler in treatmenls 2 
::and 3 lack an) inCt.:nti\C' 10 post higher olTers as a means 01' promoting the sale of high 
'. quality water. This ohservation follows text-hook theory on monopoly vs. duopoly 
prieing in stalic ditlerentiateJ product markets. according to which monopolist pri-
cing leads to lowcr prlce differences rhan duopoly pricing L1oes. Focusing on the first 
period of eadl treatmenl. stochastic equivalcnce of posteJ üffers for any unit oí' high 
". quality and low quality water cannol he rejeclt:d by a (pair-wise) U-test in any of tre-
"atments 2 and 3. In treatment 2. the low quality produeer posted a higher offer for the 
1'1 (2nd , 3rd • 41h • 5'h) unil of his/her product i 11 :-s (:-S. 7. 7. 6) out of the 14 markets. In 
this trealment. offcrs hy the seller of low qualily water were, on average, higher than 
those posted 'Jy the ~cllcr of high qua! ity \ .... aLer. In treatment 3. the same is tme on 
average but, lor the 1,1 (2I\(j, 3rd , 4'h. 5'h) uni!. we find only 4 (5. 5.4.4) observations 
in whieh the nffer postcd hy lhe seller of lo\\' qua! ity was higher than the correspon-
ding offer po~;ted by lhe seller of high qual it; (see t¡¡ble 3). 
More spe:ifically. in pefiod 35, the 1 ,\ (respectivcly, 2"(1, .... 5Th ) offer posted by 
the low quali:y seller exceeded 6 (respectivl'ly, 7,8,9, 10) times the ccln"esponding 
.... offers posted by the ~dlers of high quality water in treatment 3 and I (respectively, 
1, O, 0, O) time in treaLmenL 2. During the experiment. lhe number of times that the 
low quality produeer posted higher offers (ror any uniL of his/her product) 1han lhe 
high quality produeer \ignifieantly deereased over time in treatment 2 and increased 
in trealment :). A tw(Hai!ed Spearman rank correlation test of the null hypothesis oí' 
.. no eorrelatioll of time amI lhe number of observations in which the low quality offer 
exceeds the high one is rejeeted (favoring a positive trend). 
In few w1)rds, treatments 1 and 2 have ren(;eted better the quality differences on 
.' .• priee offers liS compared lO trealment 3, in whieh we observe a tendency towards 
equalization ,)f the ollers across products. Therefore. subjects who acted as monop-
sonistie distribution knots. have influenced the market outcome in a sense that tends 
to distort the expecled differenee in priees as a result of the difference in qualities. 
In trealm:nts 2 ami 3, the average ofters v,Jere !ower in lhe 3yh pefiod than in the 
first one and low quality produeers posted. on average, lower offers than high quality 
producers did. In trcatment l. th(; offers Cm botb proc1ucts were higher in period 35 
lhan in the first one. !n all markets anc1 in all treatments, it is observed that subjects 
who submitte d in period 1 otlers below 100 posted higher offers in the 3yh period, and 
those who pcsted otTers above lOO posted 100.ver offers in period 35. Look at table 4. 
The eom Jarisol) 01' postec1 offcrs acm~~ treatmcnts yields that, in the first period, 
monopo!.sb (trealment 1) postcd lowcr oller~ than duopolists (treatments 2 amI 
3). The Manll- \\¡hit Il,'\ [··test rejects the null hypothesis oC equal posted offcrs in tre-
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atl11enl~ l and 2 in most occasions, with lower offers in trealment l. A 
n:sult is obtaincd between lrcatrnents 1 and 3 for somc unils (espeeially for 
(lf high quality water). Contrary to what static theory would predict, it is 
thal. in the duopoly (treatment 2) offers are highcr than in the monopoly 
ConsiJering rhe dynamic nature of the experiment, an intcrpretation for 
rently odd behavioral pattem is that subjects signal cooperation in the 
l:nvironment at the beginning 01' a session, hoping to achieve the collusive. 
in í"uturc periods. In lhe case of monopoly, subjects approach equilibrium 
bclow as has heen already pointed out in other experimental studies21 . 
SCCtllS lhat high first-perioJ offers are rather specifie to oligopolists' 
al establishing lhe collusivc outcorne. On the eontrary, low offcrs in the 
seem rather specifie lo monopolists' strategics aiming at reaching from 
initially unknown optimal strategy. A further factor which could favor this¡ 
behavior obscrved in treatmenr [ may be found in the priors oí" our 
may, initially, apply theories based on real world situations in every new 
rhey face. In this sense, promotion oí" ncw products with low prices may be a 
although it scems less reasonable in our eontext. Moreover, period I's posted· 
in treatments 2 and 3 are not stochaslically different from each other. 
in perind 3S (lreatment 3) are lower than in the other treatments. especially 
ted by high quality sellers. The rnonopsonistie subjeels have used their 
and pushed down the offers posted by sellcrs of high quality water. 
The resulting market-priees fenecr what has been stated aboye: in period 1, 
senls a ehart of the average priees in the experiment. In lreatment 1, the "",p.,.", ...... 
ces inerease signifieantly over time (showcd by a Speannan rank correlation 
lrcatment 2, the high quality price increascs and the low quality price decreases, 
le in treatment 3 rhe contrary happens. However, these observations are not 
cally signifieant. Priees in trcatment 3 are lower than priees in treatments 1 and 2. 
cifically, priccs of high quality water in treatment 3 are stochastically dominaté!: 
those ol' treatment 2 in 2S periods, with increasing importance along the expelr1ll:W: 
On the demand side of the markct, in trearment 3, monopsonistie subjects 
b](.!s fOl" high quality and low quality units (average hids for the first unir are 
in figure S). As would have bccn expectcd, subjccts use thcir market 
'1 Seco cspccíally. García-Gallcgn and (Jeorgantzís (2001). 
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markcl )["icl:;; thmugh thl:ir hids. As can bl: ClJIljl:CIUrccl fmm lhe chart, ave-
bids present .\ llon-inlTl:<lsing trend. Moreovcc bascd Oll individual data, we find 
only in fournarkets 17, tl. 9,11) a (significant) de crease ofthe bid s (table 5) is 
, while, 111 markél 9, this dccreasc is only observed for the first unit. In the 
three cases :7, í-L 11). market power has been exerciscd by downstream subjects 
posted very ,imilar bids (negaüvely correlatcd with time) for the units along the 
Let us look a: lablc ú. Excepl from the three markds (7, 8. 11) ll1entioned above, 
. correlation b( twel:Il the sati"faction leve! for onc extra unit and thc bids is usual1y 
ve and, spe~ially in markets 1,2, 10 Y 14. this relation is significant. 
In trcalment 3. ~Otl1C c;ubjects (at least 3 Ollt uf 14: in markets 2.10,14) nearly 
"'I'''''''''C~U the satisfaetio]\ levels for one extra unit from their screcns, thus, hehaving 
in perlect eompetitioll. Therefore, lhe random shocks resulting from scquential 
were not smoothencd by dowllstream behavim amI were transmittcd to upstrc-
markets. As a conscqucncc, Lhe lcvels 01' s.\tisfaclion 01' lhe monopsollistie suh-
in treatment 3 decrcasc over time. Yet. in lllarkets 7, tl, and lO in which subjeets 
......... ri,"",; their monop,onistic market power, consumer surplus increased, Figure 7 
the averag.~ payotls oí" experimental subjects ror each treatmcnt over the hori-
of the expenment. Observe that. in Lrealment l. monopolish' average profits pre-
a (significant) increasing trend. Tab1e 7 includes data on (average) earnings for 
type of fin) (per ¡rcaLmenl) and levels of satisfaetíon of monopsonists, Observe 
the decreas ng trend of satisfaction lcvels for consumers in treatment 3 is signi-
(r,=.-O.3t: 1_2.Y)I)~c. 
As far as the quanTiLy of water (of each quality) allocatcd in eaeh treatment, look 
figure 8. Conparing graphs in this figure. we find that trcatment 1 exhibits most 
extraction ~Iath whlch wc would assume in lhe optimal solution, i .e., maximal 
at tlie beginll Ing. and stahilizing aL the hydrological equilihrium (where 
"",\·,.""t"" .. equals rcch"r¡.:e). Over the 35 pcriods, an average quantity wa, supplied 
respectively, (K¡,K
iI
) oc (2./:\ (lA); 2.X (! .2}) 1ll treatment 1, (2.5 (1.3): 2,1; (1.2» in 
"''''''TTIpn' 2, and (2.R (! .6): 3 (1.3)) in treatmen! :~. Tahlc R reports the average quan-
allocated in the thrcl: markets. No significant lrcnd is fnund. 
21 Small nlll'lhn..; illcll, ;lIc' 'lanoard devJalion. 
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4.3. Market Peiformance 
Lc! liS compare thc three treatments in terrns of market efficiency. 
weJfare averages (aggregated utility minus production costs) are reported 
At an aggregate leve], no significant trend is observed. However. all 
present markets in which the level of social welfare (on average) u'. ,~",""'"'''' 
cantly) over time (markets 1,2 in treatment 1; markets 5, 14 in trealment 2 
in trcalmen! 3), as well as markets in whieh this trend is (significantly) 
(rnarkcts 4, 6, 11, 12. 13 in trealment 1; markets 9, 12 in treatment 2; 
10 in trealment 3). As far as treatment 3 is eoneemed, observe that 
and 10, even in the presence of monopsonistic power, present levels of 
beJow the average social welfare (on aggregate) and, in the case of market 
catee! by the Spearman correlation coefficient, average social welfare . 
time «r,= 0.4: (2.51))). 
Figure 9 shows average social welfare along !he 35 periods. Notice 
less volatility in the trajeclory of [he averages in treatment I than in the ather . 
alments. With respect to treatment 3, since monopsonistic subjects, J',v,,,.., ....... ·, 
king. failcJ to dictate the market, thc introduction of an additional subject 
bccn responsiblc Cm more noise. 
An indicator for inefficiency in our hydrological moJel is the quantity of 
los! because the stock is al its uppcr limito incfficiency arises since rp<',,,,,,,,,<,~¡, 
tllJW into the economy are forcgone. From table !O, we perccive that the 
'saving' usagc, in terms o[ water management, prevailedunder the conditions 
atment 3 and specially fOl' the high quality water (Ioss equal to 119) . 
Moreover, in trearmenl 3, the recharge rate was more frequently exceeded 
productioJl than in the other treatments (Jess number of obscrvations which felt 
of lhe constant periodical recharge). 
5. FINAL REMARKS. POUCY IMPUCATlONS 
In a series 01' experimental markets we have lested the performance of three 
native ways oí" administrating the flow and the markel Cor two different water 
rícs. Some of the resu[ts rcportcd above ha ve straightfOl'ware! implications fOf 
mil' policy in the presence of dynamic ane! strategic complexity. 
hrst, centralization uf agent decisions on the supply or the demand side 
:"'lIXTlIRI .. \ND DlSTRlHlJTIO~ OF DIFH,REl\T WAn.R QuALlTIl.S 
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desirablc. Spccifically, centrali7.atíon of consumer actions mitígates upSlre-
power amI helps internalize lhe horinmtal externalily among consumers 
consumer lypes. In faCI, even a market with ideally behaving decentralized 
was shown to he dominated in terms of social efficicncy by a market with 
(thus, ímperfcCI) agents aCling as downstream coordinators. Furthermore, the 
of a monopsony tends to equaliLe prices across product qualíties, which 
Second. contrary 10 standard wisdom concerning market power in simpler setups, 
<4"'0,",""'" 01' decisions by an upstream monopoly also leads to higher levels of 
wel1'are ami a more ef1'icient water management. That is, givcn that the dyna-
aspects 01' water rcsource management are important, upstream centralization is 
desirable bccallse it is more likely to guarantee an efficicnt exploitation of lhe 
, and avoíd rnarket (price, quantity, profit) volatility . 
.In fact, our results indicate that volatility in al! magnitudes has been higher in the 
of a larger Ilumber of human agellts in the market. which seems to SUpp0l1 
view !hat learning ltl enbanced in lhe prcscnce oi' a more reliable feedback which 
likely to be rcccíved when subjcets <tcl in a more stable environment23 . Fur-
, the ,hock inlroduced by lhe market clearing mechanísm in treatment 2 does 
seem to have becll a serio LIS obstacle fm learning, given that price offers posted 
subjects te:1d to stabilize over time. despitc lhe volatility in the quantitíes sold and 
earned. Togelher with the remark on the reliahility of the feedback, this 
lcuds us lo Ihe eonclusion Iha! strategie comp1cxily is a more serious pro-
for human s learning in unknown envimt1ments than are moderate stochastic 
. A funher remark supporting this ellnclusiot1 is that buyer subjects' strategies 
the highest \olatilíty among all dala obtained. To the a1'orementioned short-
in our subjcets' learning, we have to add lhe faet that subjects of this type 
«unique» in eaeh ~cssion ami any imitation of ~uccessful subjeets of the same or 
types is impossiblc24 . 
23 A fealur: whíeh Wl>uld givc ,ame hUI nol !ull ,upporl to lhe very pessimislíc vicw of psycho-
like Brehmer (19NO) who claimed that Iearning í., difficult when nol imposslhlc unlcss suh-
are exposed lO (ve!'v simple) linear anu llctcrlllillisllC cnvirontncnts. 
24 As sugg~sled, atll()tl~ olher authors, hy O!Tcnnan ami Sonncmans (1998) and Dllffy ¡lDd Fel-
(1999). 
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Compari~on uf water flow management across treatments, indicates that 
mer coordination has led to a lower waste of the resouree than any orher of 
kct structures studied, although a eonstantly declining trend of the stocks 
that in a longer expcriment this seenario is the most likely to cause a problem 
lage. rn faet. this can also be concluded from the faet that, in this treatment, 
ve the recharge rate wcre observed more often than in any other treatment. 
in all treatments, average productions huve been almost as much 
slightly lower 10 equal) as natural inflow, which suggcsts that the majority of 
jccts have managed to keep the system close to its hydrological 
(inflow=sales), This al so indicates that the dynamic factor has played an 
role in subjects' actions, The consumption of high quality water exceeded on 
gc the consumption 01' low quality water in alI treatment;;, 
Regarding thc usual problems in resource extraction games, depletion 
resource doe5 not appear to be an important issue, because the cost structure 
ted subjccts from sailing too much in each period, However, we founJ that, 
a dcterministic environment in which one agent managed two resource stocks 
optimal demand conditions, a non-trivial allocation problem arises, since the 
polistic subjects needed to improve (along time) their performance, The 
we draw from our experiment is that an appropriate definition of property 
lllay be not enough [or an efficient management of rcsource markets, 
6, ApPENDIX 
6.1, Utility and costfunctions used in the experiment 
The houschold's utility is given hy the following function: 
whcrc the last teml in brackets denotes the purification costs: 
" Orlen mentinned as a solution to a huge varicty of resource-relatcd problems like, for 
pk, in Colhy el al. (1')9":\), 
li~;i 
: l; 
M¡XC¡ (JIU ,.\:"n DlSTtlIBUT¡ON OF LlllTER!'NT \V,'\TER QUALlT1ES: 11 
¡c AN I,.XE'!.IUkllc'N C/ UN \IFRTICAL S1RUCnilll: EN ,\ COMI'U,X MARKf'T 
•• ¡:C, 
, 
e (K K Q I ~ ¡~,,' (Q"i + (Km ' K,y), ir Q.,,, > QM. 
¡¡ UJh Hi1~ JII' \-li.. ' 
,;> O. othenvise 
The farmc"'s utilitv i ~ function is as follows: 
> 
UF (KHi., KfI' Q'Ii) = 1,7' Inll + 0.5 . (Q\II + :1 ' (Ku + Km)) . (Ku + KiIi.)1 
c:' TIte cast fllnction 01' produccr i (i = H, L) is given by: 
,,"C 
l' ¡- .1 Ci (K) = Je e d \1 
(1 
:CC
C 
j Thus, the following utils (unit utilities) for high quality and low quality we re 
to th,~ houschold (h) and the farrner (F): 
c,' 
.c_ 
h, household Low () 1 2 3 4 5 
._. __ .. 
""c High () () 174 301 356 378 378 
i, 1 399 492 579 637 679 711 
,¡c 2 c. 555 
_c ••• 
624 690 753 797 832 
; 3 
. 
660 717 771 822 869 906 
c; 4 740 7R9 !l36 !l80 920 959 
5 806 ::;49 R90 929 965 999 
j> -"'-
----
.... __ .-
.e. 
l!] 
.Farmer Low () 1 2 3 4 S 
High O O 187 354 471 560 631 
':c 
.. --~-
1 274 391 491 572 639 696 
%'; 2 
. __ . 
422 509 SK4 647 702 749 
3 525 
--
Sll4 655 707 7.')3 794 
.. ~;~. 4 604 662 712 757 798 834 
;;,.' 
668 717 761 801 836 869 .'cC 5 
;. .. 
:,,~. 
¡; 
¡1 
~c, 
,'Ci
c 
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6.2. Instructions26 
6.2.]. Producers 
The goal of Ihis cxperiment is the study of decision-making in eXpel1.ITlen.tal 
kets. The decisions you'll makc are directly related to your monetary reward. 
cnd of the session, you will be paid privately in cash. You can make any 
rcgareling these instructions by raising your hand. Any communication is 
biddcn anel ir will be penalized with the immediate cxclusion of the 
Tlle Experiment 
Por 45 rounds. you are going to participate in a Market Expcriment with the 
wing characteristics: 
l. You take part on a market in which there are two consumers (r~nn~si',"I]1'J1 
nne single agent in treatment 2) and two producers. Producers compete to seU 
production and you are one of them. 
2. Two commodities (good 1 and good 2) which are demand substitutes 
not identical), are supplied in the markct (each one supplied by one producer). 
producers have similar costs s!ruclures. The computer will tell you which of the 
producers you are. 
3. Although consumers have difIeren! tastes, they both prefer good 2 lo good 
You have to decide about the minimum sellinx price for each unít of your 
dllCt. To do that, you may use the following information: 
1. The tablc hellow shows lhe production cosls per unil of your product 
ECUs as our Experimental Cllrrency Unit). 
2. Using the informalion included in the table, yOl! havc lo announcefive 
l11um) prices al which you are willing lO seU your units (afterwards, you will seU 
maxímum oí' S units). 
2', In bold, we add sorne details (hat might help the readcr lo understilIld the ex.perimental sessiQOS;:;¡~ 
MIX II.RI: ,\ND DlSTRlHlJ nOi'< 01' I )II:¡;¡;RI;.,\T WATER QU¡\UTIES· 
,\N /:X/'/:R/Mt:VT ON \lERneA/ STRfTn'Rf W JI COMPI./'X MARKl:-T 
! 17 
Pricing schemes rOl' the 5ht unit bundle cannot be decreasing monotonically: 
for the fir--t unil mus! no! be highcr than the price for Lhe second unit: the 
unit price musl not be higher than the third unit pricc, and so on. 
unit co,t dccreases with Lhe stock size. Your initial stock size is 20 units and 
gel, ever)' round, three more units. Your ,tock can never exceed 20 units and, 
, a:ly additional (over 20) units you may receive are immcdiately vanishcd. 
tt 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
--------~----~----~---_r----~--_+----_r .. 
4 2 2 (] 1) o (] o 
exwr¡ple: Jmagine you are at the bcginning of a round with a stock of lO units of 
and you gel your additional 3 units (ClS you will at the beginning of each round), 
stock now is 13 units. Your unit costs for the units you produce are the lollowing: 
co:;t oí' the first unit produeed is 2 ECUs, 
eost of the second unit produecd is 2 ECUs. 
the eost oí' the third unit produced is 4 ECU s. 
eosl 01' the fout1h unit you produced is 7 ECUs. 
and, finally, (he cosí of the fifth unit produccd is 11 ECUs 
order lo eam mnI1cy, your pricing schedules must be such that each unit's pri-
the cOl'rcsponding cost. Following the examplc, the lowest profitable price 
first unir shoulcl not lie below 2 ECUs (Íls uni! eost), etc., nor should it exce-
price you fix fOl" the second unit. Thcse rules also apply lar the rest of the units . 
•. you sell 5 unils, yom stock size. in lhe following mund, would be 11 units (8 
kept plus 3 you get in the new roulld). If you don't sen any unit after your 
price schcme, yom stock would be 16 units (13 you hacl plus 3 you get). 
mukin~ and eamings 
. You have lO fill in the boxes that appcar at your computer sereen with the 
prices al which you are willing to sell your units, In each box. you will also 
atilln ah"ut each unit cost. 
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2. 80th producers decide on prices simultaneously and, as a ~V'U"",,,,U.ql1 
matioll about the other produccr's decisions will be available only after 
ovcr. 
3, Although you have to propose fíve different minimum prices, a11 
solcl al the same price: the highest unit price proposed (by a producer) . 
edecl by the correspondent bid proposed by the buyer (which reflects his 
to pay). In this way, it is al so possible to know the llumber of units sold (al! 
a pricc offer higher than the proposed consumer bid). 
4. The money you will earn at the end of the experiment will be the 
carnings yOll get in each round. The exchange rate is 10 ECU = 3 ptas. 
6.2.2. Representative Consumer (only treatment 3) 
Thc goal of this experiment is the stucly of decision-making in 
end of the session, you will be paid privately in cash. You can make any 
rcgarding these instlUctions by raising your hand. Any communication is 
bidden and it will be penalizcd with the immediate exclusion of the p.Yln ..... TT1''''nt'' 
T/¡(' Erperillu:'llt 
For 45 rounds, you are going to participate 1I1 a Market Experiment with 
following characteristics: 
I . In the market, there are one consumer representative and lwo producers. 
prodllccrs compete to sell their production and you are the consumer relJre,\'eIUUlIVt 
2. Two commadities (good I and good 2) which are demand substitutes (but 
Ilot identical), are supplied in the market (each one supplied by ane producer). 
producers huve similar costs structures. 
3. Your are the representative of all potential consumers in the market. AH 
know about consumers prcferences is that they prefer good I to good 2. : 
4. Thc table bellow includes levels of satisfaction (mcasured in ECUs, an Expe~: 
rimental ClIrrcncy Unit) for any combination ol' commoclities you can buyo Your earw1 
nings, at the end of each round, will be exactly the difference between your satisfacd 
tion levcl and your expenditure. 
MIXTI 'fU' ,\:-.Ill 1J1STRlIll
'
TIOt\ (lb' DIFIT,RI':NT \VAn::K QlJMJTltS 
,IN hX/'UilAII:,\'o/ UN V/:RIIC\L STRl'!'n'Ii/: r\ .. \ ("()MI'/,I:X AIAIiKET 
GOOdI/GOCd2 __ j- I~,~ .2 3 4 
O () 187 l61 'i2X 655 
, 
1 199 586 7'iJ X70 lJ63 
---
2 h7.' 7lJO 909 11l2t'i 1115 
3 S2tj 946 1046 11.\1 1220 
4 '/77 1064 1151 1232 1300 
5 IOS.2 lIó') 12'¡'~J 1.112 1379 
llLJ 
5 
772 
1052 
1186 
1291 
1371 
1437 
You have to decide Oll your reservation pricl: (i,c, the highest amount of money 
are willing to pay rOl eaeh unit of produet) 1'or/l\,(, units of each producto To do 
, you may liS,: thc following facts: 
a) The reservatíon pnce schedule you wblllit in each round should be not mono-
increasing, Tha( i~. (he highest price you are willing to pay for the second 
of any good mus! no! hc higher than lhe highest pricc you are willing to pay for 
first unit of the samc produet, and so on amI so [orlh. 
b) Each round, your real consumptiol1 \'Vill be restrieted to a maximum of 5 unÍts 
each product. 
, ion making (//1(ll:'iln¡il1gs 
l. Introduce (in the computer) your decisions about rcservalÍon priees and be 
to use thc appropriate boxes. In a round. all unit" of the same produet are sold 
the same priee: the nunimin (the highcst 01' the mínimum priccs which results from 
producer's wiJlingnc,~ lo aeecpl) whieh lies below ~ome (highest) price which 
from y{lur willingncss to payo This way. the numbcr of units that are sold in 
, market is dir<:etly dctcrmincel, 
2. Every timo: you choosc the highest price you are willing to pay for eaeh unit of 
you will gd spccific information abou( thc incremental value on the utilíty 
by the eonsumer~ you represent. 
3. In each rcund. although you have to propose fjve different reservation príecs, 
units of the same product are sold at the samc Illarkct price: the highest price offer 
is exceeded by your corrcsponding biel, Since this unil is the last one the pro-
is willing lo sel1 (amI you to buy). this unit is the last unit sold in the market. 
4. Your earnmgs will he ¡he elifferenee belw:een lhe value got from the eonsump-
(the valué rdlectcd 111 tile table) ancl thc cxpenditure in purchasing the units. 
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AII eXmn¡J/e: Look al lhe table above.IL in the previous fOund, you 
of good 2, your potential earnings, as a function of the units of good 1 
the correspondent eolumn), are: 
Ir you huy no units of good 1 eonsumers get a utility value of 361 
ir you huy 1 unit of good 1, consumers get a utility value 01' 753 ECUs, 
if you huy 2 unils of good 1, consumers get a utility value of 909 
ir you buy 3 units of good 1, consumers get a utility value of 1046 
ir you buy 4 unÍts of gooa 1, eonsumers get a utilíty value oí' 1151 
ancl, finally. if you buy 5 units of good 2: consumers gel a utility value of 1 
5. In rhe interface of your computer. you will find boxes in which you 
wrilc your bids for eaeh unit of produet. You also find rhe utility value got 
purehase. For example, if you prefer to buy one unit of product 1 rather 
Ihe increase in the utility value you got is 392 ECUs (the difference between 
361 ). 
Your nel payment will be half of consumer earnings. The exchange rate 
EC U so::3 ptas. 
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8. FIGURES 
Figure l. Water üístribulion structure in treatments 1 and 'l 
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Figure 3. Enu-period stock; cummulative distribution for the three treatments. 
percentage of the total stock; horizontal axis: interval of stocks 
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Figure 4. Average stock sizes (trc¡¡(ments 1-3) 
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hgurc .'i. End-period stock: cummulative distribution for the three treatments. 
percentage of lhe total stock; horizontal axis: interva] of stocks 
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Figure (" Average clearing prices rDr [(l\\/high quality water (trcatmentsl-3) 
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Figure 7, Average payoffs (treatments 1-3) 
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Figure ¡,;. Average quantity ~old of each quality (treatments 1-3) 
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Figure 9, Average Social Welfarc (treatments 1-3) 
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l\llX·IITRI\~1) DISTRIBUTION OF ()jf'f'LIU':-'¡·1 WATER QLJALlTIES: 1:11 
A V I:X!'I·RI·\IFXr ()N VFRtICAI. 'Ii«iCTl.'llh IN ,\ COMI'U:X MARKET 
9. T¡\RLES 
Tablc l. Slock '1/.l'S ILow/High 4ualí1yl 1Il1realmcnt, 1-3 after 35 pcríods 
SLI SIII SU SIl2 SU SIl3 
1 ~ lú 17 (, 9 11 
IX 14 11 5 9 13 
l) 13 17 -l 15 14 
') 11 () 10 ') 16 
I~ 16 11 13 20 15 
1') ILJ 1 S 15 6 12 
5 X 17 7 7 10 
:-1 ') 14 15 10 .'i 
1I ') ! .5 4 8 
I~ 7 11 17 4 5 
h 4 , 11 11 13 [3 
11 ti 4 20 15 IX 17 1) 12 20 13 lO 9 J7 K 17 4 ---_._ ... 125 12 12 (, 9.4 11.6 1I 
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Table 2. First unit posted offers (w) in periods 1 and 35 (treatments 1-3). \.-UllSLUU< 
bids eb) (treatment 3). 
35 
MIXTlII{I·. AND DISTRmUTION Oc DIFFERENT WATER QUALlTlES: 133 
AN f;XNIiIMENT (IN VFRTlCAI. YIR[H '{URE IN A COMI'LEX MARKET 
SpCllman rallk correlation cDcfficien( (rs) and t-test o[ time dependence oI 'disc-
quilihrium' offen, (i.e., wL>wH) 
* -7.7* -'S.7" -5.2"'-5.9* 4.3* 3.1* 3.[* 4.7* 5.3* 
of HO at a= .O'S-leve! of slgni ficance (Itl> 2.(4) 
U statistics of pairwise comparison bctwccn posted offers (treatments[ -3) 
wS 53* 61 
Note: Tht! expectcd value of the U-statü,¡ic is 9R. 
~UlV~llel1t distributiolls of offers aeross t['calmen!s. 
46* 58.5 [ 6.5** 
Rejection oi' H" in favour of the a[lernalive of highcr offcr~ in ¡he [alter' (former**) treat-
(u::>.OS; U<55) 
1"1 
Tahlc 5_ 
2 r 
I 
3 r 
I 
4 r 
r. 
I 
6 rr 
t 
7 r 
1 
X r, 
9 r 
lO r 
11 I 
I 
12 r 
13 r 
14 r 
Agrc- r 
gilt~ 
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Spcarman rank (r, ) correlation coefficient and Hest of posted 
(treatment 3) 
5J9* 
OA7 0.44 0.32 0.36 0.24 0.26 
3.02* 2.81 * 1.91 2.23* 1.45 1.54 
016 0.15 0.17 0.14 0.10 0.31 -0.03 -0.06 
0.95 0.84 l.02 0.80 0.60 1.86 -0.19 -0.32 
0.27 OJO rU5 OA2 0.51 0.05 0.11 0.41 
1.61 1.80 2.18* 2.69' 3.39' 0.31 0.61 2.56* 
0.45 OA9 0.35 0.23 0.15 0.49 0.24 0.16 
2.93* 3.20* 2.12* 1.35* 0.89 3.21 * 1.44 0.90 
OAO OA5 0.51 0.65 0.68 -O.2l 0.11 0.12 
2.53' 2.87' 3.44' 4.98* 5.38* -1.26 0_61 0.70 
-0.21 -0.20 -0.10 -O.O~ OA6 -0.44 
-1.25 -l.l7 -0.59 -OA6 -2.99" -2.82* 
-OAO -0.35 
-2.47* -2 .. 16* 
0.38 0.37 
2.36' 2.28* 
0.63 0.57 
4,66* 4.00' 
-0.77 -0.78 -0.74 -0.57 -024 -0,85 -0.88 -0.89 
-6.97* -7.05' -6.32* -4.00' -1.39 -9.33* -10.82" -11.38* 
-(U 4 -0,16 0.06 0.22 0.09 0.12 0.27 0.18 
-0.81 -0.93 -0.37 1.33 0.52 0.68 1.60 1.05 
-OJ4 -0.16 -0_06 0.22 0.09 0.12 0.27 0.18 
O.SI -0.93 -0.37 1.33 0.52 0.68 1.60 1.0S 
O.lJ 0,14 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.26 0.33 OA6 
0.74 0.81 1.12 1.14 1.10 1.55 2.03* 3.01' 
o.m 0.089 0.071 0.076 O.l41 -0.41 -0.34 -0.46 
0.174 0.514 0.41 0.439 0.818 -2.6* -2.07* -2.94* 
,vote .. 11,,: r,lt,b(.ll=Ü 
'¡,. n:jcction of HO al a"'.05 level of significance (ltl>2.o4) 
- lhe minus sign indicates negativc corrclation 
-0.86 
-9.49* 
0.27 
1.64 
0.27 
1.64 
0.21 
1.22 
-0.33 
-2,02 
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AlI /:'XPERlMf,N/'ON VU(I'lCAL S'IRUCTUIN.-IN ¡t COMi'LEX MARKET 
6. Spearman rank (r ) correlalion coefficient and Hest 01' postcd bids (b) with consu-
unit satlsfadion lev,'1 (fOl' one extra unit) which was displaycd on lhe subject's screen 
(trealment ]), 
1.24 3JI" 
r, 0.1" 0,83 0,47 051 0,45 0,90 OM 0,69 0.76 
[ 7JJ3* KA6 i , J.ü7* 3,40* 293* 11.76* 15,64* 5.44* 6,69* 
r, 0.3<~ 0,17 (L08 om -()20 -0.05 OJ5 0,16 0.22 -0,05 
t 2,05' 097 OA7 OAO -l.I7 -0.31 2.16' 0% ]JI -031 
" 
-0,02 006 0.D2 O.ü9 ()O') -()14 0.33 OA3 023 0,37 
I -0,11 0.1' (LlO 052 050 -078 2.02* 2,n' lJS 228* 
r, 0,61 OJ'i 0,19 -0,17 -0,20 0,15 0,88 024 0,00 -0.06 
[ 4,6:* 2,]3' 1.14 -0.96 -LIS 0,84 lOA1'" lJ9 -0.01 -033 
r, 0,1 t (),2fJ 0.21 0.31 0,75 ·OJ7 0.44 0,44 032 OJO 
t O,X] 1.53 1.26 1.87 6,56' -2.27 * 2,85' 2,78' 1.92 1.83 
-0,1 K -0..11 OAl -033 -0,25 -026 -0.36 -O,IR -O.Jl -0.25 
-2.56 -255' -2.02* ·IA8 -1.54 -2D* -LOS -0.61 -1,48 
-OAI ·11.44 
-2.61' -2,83' 
OIO 0,18 
1.17 1.06 
0.27 OS5 0.47 ()62 -0,0] 0,02 ·0,04 0,23 OAl 
1.61 3.74* 3,05* 4j()* ·()Ü4 0.11 -025 iJ7 259* 
-----
r, -OJ4 -(J.67 -0,66 -0,66 -0,38 -OJi8 0,63 ·056 -0.55 -OJ6 
t ·6.~4' -5,lú i -5,08* -5,10" -234' -533* -4,61* -3.91* -3.79* -224* 
" 
-O: )1 lUJO 0.26 OJ2 UA4 0,12 0.2l) OJO 0.57 0,18 
r -OJ7 11.111 L55 5,88' 2.85* (J,71 1.77 L78 4,01* 1,06 
" 
0,:!6 010 0,08 025 0,00 0,07 0,13 -(),O6 OJ2 OÜ4 
r 1,:í2 1I,:i7 0.46 IA6 lUlO IL41 0.75 ·0,34 1.94 0.21 
" 
O.lí4 0.7:; 0,82 0,68 lUS 0,91 0,64 ll,96 OJO 0.44 
t 4,19" 6AV 8.31' 539* 7,12* 12.53' 4,84* 1939* 5.57' 2,85* 
of HO al a=JJ) level 01 slgnificancc (11I>2,04) 
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Tahle 7. Average profits for each type of nnn and each water quality (treatments 
!evels of satisfaction (on average) for the monopsonist (C3) in treatment 3. ,).p~:arrnanr"Í1 
correlation coefficient and t-test of time dependence for subjects' payoffs 
/' 
Av. P (L1) 196 222 188 210 209 113 188 185 188 168 109 
012 0.85 0.01 0.37 0.28 O -0.30 033 0.60 0.40 0.73 
069 9.31* 0.08 2.3' 1.68 -0.20 -1.50 2.03 4.35* 2.52* 6.07* 
'\\'. P(HI 316 288 275 293 148 288 220 234 240 89.9 
r 0.28 0.08 OJ2 0.16 0.24 0.27 0.47 0.70 0.48 0.76 
I 1.65 0.45 1.92 0.93 1.45 1.58 3.05' 5.57* 3.18* 6.76' 
TI' 2 Al'. P 316 [70 184 208 [60 [66 261 206 271 2][ 
r.~ 0.29 0.19 0.[2 0.16 0.14 0.29 0.07 -0.4 0.61 0.13 
1.74 1.12 0.72 0.95 0.83 1.73 0.40 -2.5* 4.42* 0.74 
Av.P [70 347 355 325 380 315 347 195 298 282 
r, O -0.40 -0.20 0.19 0.34 0,07 0.56 -0.20 0.61 0.65 
I -0.20 -2.2* -1.30 1.08 2.08' 0.40 3.83* -1.10 4.39* 4.92* 
TI'. ~ 142 202 134 199 [83 21[ [48 [42 154 79.5 
0.20 0.21 0.27 0.19 0.24 0.10 0.43 -0.10 O 0.02 
!.l8 1.22 1.59 1.13 1.4 0.57 2.77' -050020 0.10 
Av. P 288 237 232 249 222 204 174 329 207 [66 286 
0.28 0.02 0.53 0.25 0.47 -0.10 -0.40 -0.30 -0.40 -0.70 0.57 
1.70 0.12 3.57' ISO l05* -0.60 -2.4* -170 -2.7* -5.4* 4.02* 
Av.P 631 660 656 581 717 579 731 628 608 517 558 587 
r -0.29 0.02 -0.71 -0.28 -0.57 0.25 0.56 -0.45 -0.14 0.25 ~0.36 0.20 
-1.77 0.13 -5.8' -1.65 -3.95* 1.51 3.92* -2.89*-0.83 1.46 -2.22* 1.19 
lVo/e: The null hypothesís is H,,: r-lt, 1'I,(t)]0{). The asterisk (*) represents a rejection of H" at 
level ol' slgnificance (ltI>2.o4). The sign (-) indicates negative correlation 
n.· 
lv1IXTUKl-. AND DISTRIBlTION 01' nlFFFRFNT WArER QlIALlTIES 
;"v rXeHIIMr:NT (iN \fF.RTlCAI. STRL'rTf!li}: IN A COMPLEX MARKET 
Table 8. Average allocated quantity of each waler qualíly (treatments 1-31 
-
Markel KLI KHI KL2 KH2 KL3 Km 
1 2.23 2.26 1.71 3.17 3.23 3.17 
2 I.4Y 1.09 2.ü9 3.34 3.23 3.14 
3 2.77 2.91 l.EI) 3.29 2.91 3.03 
4 3.23 3.17 2.89 3.03 1 3.23 2.83 5 , 2.60 2.S0 2.69 2.KO 1.94 3 
6 1.46 1.40 1.77 2.91 3.29 3.09 
7 ~.14 1Jl6 1.74 1.29 2.S6 2.94 
8 3.26 3.23 2.94 ]JI 2.57 3.11 
9 3.20 .1.23 3.26 334 1.37 3.26 
10 2.80 3.29 3.14 0.86 3.11 3.26 
11 3.34 3.37 3.17 3.14 \.66 2.23 
12 3.17 3.17 3.34 3.D 2.S9 2.94 
13 2.77 2.91 2.43 3 2.[4 2.71 
14 3.23 3.23 2.[1 2.97 2.97 3.37 
Avera~e 2.76 2.79 2.51 2M 2.S1 3.01 
0_. _ 
median 2",7 3.11 2.56 3.09 2.94 3.06 
_. 
_ .. - -_.~~. 
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Table 9. Avera@~ social wdfare (ASW) in each market and on aggregate. Spearm,uHank corre1a-
tion coefficient (r) and t -tc,t of time dependence of social we1fare in each market (treatments 1-3) 
Treat- Markel 
ment 
___ o 
ASW 942 674 
r, O SO 0.54 
I 3.11* 3.68' 
4 5 6 9 10 11 12 13 14 Av. 
1053 [140 1070 692 110'; 1115 1m 1117 1009 1146 10H2 1164 1031 
O.OS -0.41 0.03 -0,36 Olfi -0.330.03 -0.[80.68 -0.53 -0.530.08 -0.1 
0.27 -2.61* 0.18 -2.23- OY3 -1.98 -0.19 -1.06 -5,30*-359*·3.56' -0.45 -0.59 
~--r----+~~-----------------
2 ASW 995 923 1027 1058 IOSH 100(¡ 994 R39 1021 773 1102 919 1072 1014 986 
r, -emo.!1 0.33 -0.01 0.77 -0.270.20 0.16 -O.RX 0.11 -0.06 -059 OJO 0.38 -0.07 
-C.lll -0.64 2.Dl -DOS 6.96* -1641\9 09610.39*0.63 -0.34 -4.21' 1.78 2.33*0.4 
t--+-----+_ 
ASW 
, 
t 
_. 
11159 1061 1098 1022 1029 ll22 994 1053 1100 969 762 1085 1016 1006 1075 
-{ 560)7 -o 0\ -o 23 1) 15 -() 17 (] 16 040 -() 61 ·017 o 01 -o [5 o 2S -() 28 -o 27 ._, . - ,. 
-386* ·1.60 0.18 1.36 0.87 0.98 094 2.5 l' -4.37*-2.26' 0.07 -0.85 1.48 1.66 -1.63 
. _ .. -
: Note: The null hypothcsis is fin: rolt, SW(t)]",o. Thc m,lcrisk (*) represents a rejection of Ho al u oo .05 
level of significance (111)2041. The sign (-) indicatcs ncgativc correlation 
Table 10. Resourl'e losscs by each quality water (trcatmcnts 1-3) due to under~exploitation 
(units of recharge which did nOl cntcr ¡he respective basin) 
_. 
Resource Rcsource #(KL < 3) #(KII < 3) II(KL=3) #(KH = 3) 
Loss L Loss H 
TI 216 IS9 195 200 147 157 
.T2 334 199 21R 210 153 110 
TI 225 119 lHO 178 92 100 
. ~e: Symbol # f!oles lhe Ilumher of observ~tions in which lhe quantity felt short of the constant 
nodical recharJ2c 
Ü 
